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ABSTRACT 
 
In a wrongful termination case, the defendant has the burden of proving that the plaintiff did not 
adequately discharge his or her duty to mitigate damages.  The defendant may satisfy its burden by 
proving that the claimant failed to exercise “reasonable care and diligence” in seeking a job; and it 
must do so by a preponderance of the evidence.  On the other hand, the amount of any award turns 
on the difference between the plaintiff’s pre- and post-termination earnings.  Thus, there is a 
conflict between the potential increased damages award made possible by remaining jobless and the 
legal duty to mitigate.  It is reasonable to assume that a plaintiff may perceive an incentive to stay 
out of the workforce to enhance the damage award.   
 
In this paper we empirically establish the expected joblessness duration period for a plaintiff’s 
population cohort in a wrongful termination lawsuit; we also calculated the estimated duration 
period’s associated standard error.  To illustrate the procedure we discuss a hypothetical case study 
and use uncensored data on joblessness duration from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Displaced 
Workers Survey.   
 
This process enables us structure a hypothesis test examining whether the plaintiff’s period of 
joblessness is statistically significantly different from the predicted test statistic in a manner 
consistent with case law.  Succinctly, we are able to empirically assess the soundness of the 
duration of a plaintiff’s job search and thereby enhance the robustness of present-day approaches.     
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
n wrongful termination cases, the law obliges a plaintiff to find a comparable job and mitigate losses as 
much as possible.
1
  It is a defendant‟s burden to demonstrate that plaintiff has not adequately discharged 
his or her duty to mitigate.
2
 Defendant may satisfy its burden by showing that claimant failed to exercise 
“reasonable care and diligence,” and it must do so by a preponderance of the evidence.3  
 
Because the amount of any award turns on the difference between plaintiff‟s pre- and post-termination 
earnings there is a conflict between the potential increased damages award made possible by remaining unemployed 
and the legal duty to mitigate.  Thus, all else being equal, it is reasonable to assume that a plaintiff may perceive an 
incentive to stay out of the workforce to enhance the damage award.  Put differently, but for the litigation, there is no 
                                                 
1 Gonzalez, Richard J., “Satisfying the Duty to Mitigate in Employment Cases: A Survey and Guide,” Mississippi Law Journal, Volume 69 (Winter 
1999) 749, provides and excellent overview of the law regarding mitigation of damages. 
2 Sheehan v. Donlen Corp.,173 F 3d 1039, 1048 (7th Circuit); NRLB v. Thalbo Corp., 171 F. 3d 102, 112 (2d Cir. 1999).   
3 See, Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F. 2d 1231, 1243 (3rd Cir. 1977). 
I 
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reason to expect plaintiff would behave any differently from a comparable cohort group.  Therefore, there is no reason 
to suspect that plaintiff‟s observed period of joblessness would differ significantly from those of his cohort group.   
 
Of course, discrimination may impart particular psychological and emotional difficulties on individuals that 
are not found among a comparable group of workers displaced as a result of reasons other than discrimination.  These 
are limitations of the model that cannot be circumvented in a legal proceeding without additional evidence.  
 
Our objective in this paper is necessarily narrow.  Specifically, we calculate empirically the expected range 
of joblessness duration for a carefully constructed plaintiff cohort group using a publicly available dataset. This range 
allows an empirical assessment of the soundness of the duration of plaintiff‟s search.  Specifically, it allows one to 
determine if the difference between the observed length of plaintiff‟s joblessness and the length derived from a model 
of plaintiff‟s cohorts is statistically significant; thereby providing a more robust basis to address the rebuttable 
presumption.   
 
To obtain the test statistic – the model-derived length of observed joblessness – we use a multivariate 
regression approach on uncensored unemployment duration data from the Current Population Survey
4
. We provide a 
hypothetical case study to illustrate the methods.   
 
The paper is organized as follows. The following section discusses the problem we confront and provides 
background on the economics literature.  We are not aware of any direct attempts at empirically rebutting the duty to 
mitigate.  However, there is considerable literature on related empirical approaches to employment discrimination 
topics.  In the third section we provide the theoretical background justifying why we expect that a litigation process 
alters plaintiff‟s structure of incentives, encouraging a lengthier period of joblessness.  The fourth section contains our 
empirical work and results.  Section five discusses relevant case law, demonstrating that the proposed test here is 
consistent with past decisions relying on statistical testing.  The last section concludes and discusses the limitations of 
the analysis.  
 
DEMONSTRATING PLAINTIFF’S DUTY TO MITIGATE 
 
If defendant prevails, the law allows deductions from any backpay awards of any monies plaintiff should 
have earned but for the wrongful termination.
5
  If plaintiff is believed to have been remiss in securing comparable 
post-termination employment, the law allows for a salary imputation; the level and length of the imputed salary 
becomes the relevant question.
6
  Enhanced robustness of the methodology used to appraise employment 
discrimination awards is an ongoing concern of Forensic Economists.  Recent work by White, Tranfa-Abboud, & 
Holt,
7
 and Trout
8
 address the need and relevance of attrition rates for economics loss calculations in employment 
discrimination models.  Macpherson and Piette provide empirical evidence on the extent to which involuntarily 
terminated employees are able to close the earnings gap between pre and post termination salary levels.
9
 However, to 
our knowledge the process underscoring plaintiff‟s duty to mitigate has not been empirically examined.   
 
When embarking on demonstrating that plaintiff has not discharged his duty to mitigate, defendant‟s counsel 
typically offers to the court the testimony of a professional “head-hunter,” vocational expert or an industrial 
                                                 
4 The general web site is www.bls.census.gov/cps. See, Kurt V. Krueger, “Calculate Labor Force Participation Tables Using CPS Microdata,” 
Litigation Economics Review, Volume 5, Number 2 (2002), for an excellent introduction to the current population survey data.   
5 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1)(1994) 
6 The same consideration may extend to determination of front-pay awards as well.  
7 White, Paul F., Josefina V. Tranfa-Abboud, and Frederick M. Holt., “The Use of Attrition Rates for Economic Loss Calculations in Employment 
Discrimination Cases: A Hypothetical Case Study,” Journal of Forensic Economics, Volume 16, Number 2 (2003) 209-223.  
8 Trout, Robert R., “Duration of Employment: Updated Analysis,” Journal of Forensic Economics, Journal of Forensic Economics, Volume 16, 
Number 2 (2003) 201-207. [updating work set out in Robert R. Trout, “Duration of Employment in Wrongful Termination Cases,” Journal of 
Forensic Economics, Volume 8, Number 2 (1995) 167-177.] See, also Melvin Hughes., “Duration of Employment in Employment Discrimination 
Cases,” Journal of Forensic Economics, Volume 10, Number 1 (1997) 73-75; Tyler J. Bowles, “Wrongful discharge: The time horizon of future 
damages and the economic basis for damages,” Journal of Legal Economics, Volume 4, Number 1 (1994) pp. 75–82. 
9 Macpherson, David A. and Michael J. Piette, “Do Terminated Employees Catch Up? Evidence from the Displaced Workers Survey,” Journal of 
Forensic Economics, Volume 16, Number 2 (2003) pp. 189-199. 
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psychologist.   These experts opine on the job search process or on conditions of the relevant job market(s).  Although 
the job search process is not rigidly defined there is a general framework that job placement specialists increasingly 
follow. To some commentators that framework may constitute a baseline or standard that may facilitate the 
assessment of whether a plaintiff has conducted a “reasonable and effective” job search.10   
 
Testimony on job market conditions implicitly, albeit indirectly, alludes to plaintiff‟s employment prospects.  
Although such testimony offers the trier-of-fact a subjective assessment of unemployment duration, unassisted by 
unemployment duration statistics a job placement expert‟s opinion is sufficiently general that it often renders the 
expert‟s contribution highly susceptible to effective cross-examination.   
 
A placement expert‟s opinions derive from their close understanding of the operational dynamics of labor 
markets.  Many employment search experts point to unemployment duration estimates published by the U.S. 
Department of Labor and state agencies as basis for their testimony.
11
  The Displaced Worker Survey, for example, 
contains data on time elapsed between jobs from national population surveys, typically parsed by any number of 
geographic, demographic and socio-economic variables.  The Displaced Worker Survey provides information for 
people who found jobs as presented for select variables below.  
 
 
Table 1: Univariate Results for Unemployment Duration 
 
Variable Age Category Obs 
Median 
Unemp 
Duration 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] 
Mean Unemp 
Duration 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] 
Age [15,30] 122 6 (5,8) 11.7 (8.3,15.0) 
 [30,43] 61 8 (6,12) 11 (11.0,22.4) 
 [43,57] 53 13 (9,16) 15.8 (15.8,31.2) 
 [57,90] 12 12 (6,26) 6.7 (6.7,25.6) 
Region Northeast 77 12 (8,15) 20.7 (14.9,26.4) 
 Other 171 7 (6,8) 13.4 (10.4,16.4) 
Class of Job Private Sector 43 12 (8,16) 19.1 (12.9,25.4) 
 Other 3 12 (8, .) 18.6 (-17.0,54.4) 
Married Yes 77 8 (6,10) 14 (14.0,18.2) 
 No 171 8 (6,9) 16.4 (12.8, 19.9) 
Race White 188 8 (6,8) 14.2 (13.5,27.3) 
 Other 60 9 (8,13) 20.4 (11.2,17.1) 
Sex Male 131 8 (6,9) 15.5 (11.7,19.3) 
 Other 101 8 (6,11) 15.8 (11.7,20.0) 
 
 
Thus, an expert would testify to the duration of joblessness for a particular characteristic of plaintiff from the 
variables arrayed above; these can be combined often for two variables in categorical style data tables. These 
independently gathered statistics may impart an increased degree of robustness to an expert‟s testimony. For example, 
if plaintiff is a white male in one of the northeastern states, an employment expert may obtain and present to the court 
data published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics showing the median or average duration of joblessness for white 
males in the Northeast and contrast that statistic to the duration of plaintiff‟s search.   
 
But univariate or bivariate statistics alone will match the precise facts of the terminated employee only by 
coincidence.  No attempt is made to determine whether the observed difference between the proffered duration 
statistic and plaintiff‟s duration is statistically significantly.     
                                                 
10 Diamond, Charles and Damon Montal, “Wrongful Termination, Damage Period Length and Mitigation,” NYSBA L&E Newsletter, Volume 30, 
Number 1 (Spring/Summer 2005), 15-18 [ …explaining a job process methodology and recommending it serve as a standard against which to 
evaluate plaintiff‟s job search process and presumably, elicit an assessment of reasonableness.] 
11 See, for example, Robert Male & David C. Toppino, “Economic Foundations for Employment Case Analysis,” Journal of Legal Economics, 
Volume 11, Number 3 (Winter 2001-02) [“It is possible to make this type of comparison using data sets that provide mean, or percentile, earnings 
rates years of experience or skill level.”] at 10. 
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As a result, plaintiff‟s counsel can easily challenge the applicability of defense‟s statistic alleging that the 
case under litigation contains sufficient particularities and idiosyncracies.  For example, opposing counsel may reveal 
that plaintiff is married, which may be a variable whose influence is not explicit accounted for in the duration-of-
joblessness statistic selected by the expert, and thereby render plaintiff sufficiently distinct from the norm represented 
by the expert‟s statistic.  By design, employment data describe the average experiences of job seekers whereas 
plaintiffs typically are claiming unusual circumstances. 
 
Multivariate models incorporating relevant covariates are capable of incorporating many of the important 
elements that allow the expert to “particularize” to some degree the proffered statistic and thereby mitigate the 
argument that the univariate or bivariate unemployment duration is too broad.  Multivariate regression models are well 
established in employment case law.
12
  The courts may have indirectly facilitated the use of multivariate regression by 
requiring that the fact finder evaluate the reasonableness of plaintiff‟s search “in light of the individual characteristics 
of the claimant and the job market.”13 
 
To the extent that the differential between plaintiff‟s joblessness duration and those of his cohort group 
extends beyond two standard deviations we argue that this is consistent with the law‟s understanding of significance 
as applied originally in Castaneda v. Partida.
14
  Because the objective is to document that plaintiff‟s search is 
unreasonable, statistical evidence supporting such a showing may impeach the witness, which may have the effect of 
shifting the burden of proof – leading ultimately to the imputation of back wages and an adjustment of backpay 
awards. 
 
The argument has limitations, needless to say.  On the one hand, a model cannot be perfect, only better than 
an alternative model. In this case, the alternative model is the heuristic one favored by headhunters and other job 
search professionals.  Available data will reproduce the particulars of a plaintiff imperfectly.  On the other hand, the 
legal argument turns on the weight allowed statistical reasoning in court proceedings.     
 
ON MODELING DURATION OF JOBLESSNESS 
 
What are the expected effects of litigation windfall on a plaintiff‟s decision to return to work?  The point of 
departure is Mortensen‟s basic job search model with endogenous search effort.15  Given a particular search intensity 
s, the individual will receive job offers according to some rate lambda λ, where the arrivals are directly and positively 
increasing with search intensity; that is lambda is increasing in s, λ=φ(s).  The individual is able to choose the 
intensity of the job search, s.  Offers are random drawings from a wage offer distribution F (w). Every time an offer 
arrives the decision has to be made whether to accept it or reject it and search further. Once a job is accepted, it will be 
held forever at the same wage. During unemployment, a flow of benefits b is received, and a flow of search costs has 
to be paid; search costs also increase with increases in search intensity; c(s).  
 
The individual maximizes the expected present value of income over an infinite horizon, with discount rate r. 
It is well known that in this model the optimal strategy of unemployed individuals can be characterized by a 
reservation wage f and an optimal search intensity s. 
 
Consider an unemployed individual, party to a wrongful termination lawsuit, who allegedly searches for a job 
while litigation proceeds; the prospect of prevailing in a discrimination lawsuit or favorably settling the matter 
increases unemployed plaintiff‟s reservation wage.  Specifically, a large anticipated award or a significantly high 
probability of prevailing in court, directly impacts an individuals reservation wage.  As an individual‟s reservation 
wage increases, the range of acceptable wage offers shrinks to the upper part of the offered wage distribution. As a 
                                                 
12 See, Julie Lee and Caitlin Liu, “Measuring Discrimination in the Workplace: Strategies for Lawyers and Policymakers,” The University of 
Chicago Law School Roundtable, Volume 6 (1999) 195. 
13 Rasimas v. Michigan Department of Mental Health, 714 F.2d 614, 624 (6th Cir.1983); Sellers v. Delgado College,902 F. 2nd 1189, 1193 (5th Cir. 
1990); James L. Hughes et al., Backpay in Employment Discrimination Cases, 35 Vand. L. Rev. 893, 1018 (1982). 
14 430 U.S. 482 (1977). 
15 Mortensen, Dale T., “Job search and labor market analysis,” in Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 2, Orley Ashenfelter and Richard Layard, 
Eds. (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1986); see, also, T.J. Devine and N.M. Kiefer., Empirical Labor Economics: The Search Approach (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1991). 
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consequence, the duration of unemployment is likely to increase.   On the other hand, the lengthier the joblessness 
spell, the higher the costs to the individual including the disutility of being party to an unpleasant adversarial process.  
Increased cost reduces the incentives of a plaintiff to remain out of the workforce and increases the probability of exit.  
Thus, the net effect of the competing incentives on the optimal level of search is unknown ex ante but depend heavily 
on the likelihood of prevailing in court and the magnitude of the prospective award. 
 
Throughout the 1960‟s, 1970‟s and 1980‟s, in what has come to be known as wrongful discharge laws, 
Federal law imposed limitations upon employers‟ hiring and firing practices;16 states followed.  The results carved out 
exemptions to the historical common law doctrine of employment-at-will that allowed termination of the employment 
relationship at any time, by either party.  Wrongful discharge laws created a cause of action enabling terminated 
employees the right to sue employers for wrongful discharge under certain circumstances, even though the 
employment was otherwise at-will.   
 
Various commentators have examined the relationship between wrongful termination laws and the labor 
force.  Dertouzos and Karoly
17
 examined aggregate state-level data from 1980 to 1987 and found the adoption of 
wrongful discharge laws resulted in reduction in employment levels; Morris found similar results.
18
  Autor, Donohue 
and Schwab
19
 confirm the disemployment effects of wrongful discharge laws.
20
  
 
Results of empirical examinations of the effects suggest that the laws increased the duration of 
unemployment spells.  Accordingly, all else being equal, it is reasonable to assume that the optimal level of search for 
a litigating plaintiff is greater than the optimal search of an individual lacking the prospects of litigation award that 
would provide compensation during a period of unemployment. 
 
Thus, the empirical determination of length-of-joblessness for an individual that shares similar demographic 
and socio-economic characteristics of the plaintiff serves as a lower limit on the expected duration of a plaintiff‟s 
reasonable search as required by the legal duty to mitigate. 
 
To facilitate the exposition of the three approaches proposed here we rely on the following hypothetical 
example.   
 
Case Study: A 43 year-old white male was allegedly wrongfully terminated and has sued for redress.  The job was 
a white collar, job in the Northeastern part of the United States. Plaintiff is married and has no children.  Plaintiff 
has been out of work for 97 weeks and claims that he has searched extensively but to no avail. In addition, he has 
been unable to obtain temporary work.  As proof of the reasonableness of the search he has kept a log of interviews 
and applications.   
 
Thus, the objective is to obtain a measure of joblessness duration for a group that resembles plaintiff and test 
to see whether plaintiff‟s period of joblessness is statistically significantly different from the calculated statistic.  
Consistent with case law, the difference will be considered statistically significant if it differs by at least two standard 
deviations.   
 
 
 
                                                 
16 The most well known are the National Labor Relations Act (1935), the Civil Rights Act (1964), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(1967) and the American with Disabilities Act (1990). 
17 Dertouzos, James N. and Lynn A. Karoly, Labor Market Responses to Employer Liability (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, Institute for Civil Justice, 
1992). 
18 But see Thomas J. Miles, “Common Law Exceptions to Employment at Will and U.S. Labor Markets,” Journal of Law, Economics, and 
Organizations, Volume 16, Number 1 (April 2000) pp. 74-101 [finding that wrongful discharge laws had no significant effects on total 
unemployment and unemployment rates.] 
19 Autor, David, John J. Donohue III, and Stewart J. Schwab., “The Employment Consequences of Wrongful-Discharge Law: Large, Small, or None 
at All?” American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, Volume 94, No.2 (May 2004) 440-446.  
20 They conclude that Dertouzos and Karoly, supra, note 17, significantly overestimate the disemployment effects of wrongful discharge laws while 
the Miles, supra, note 18, study underestimates the effects.   
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A MULTIVARIATE MODEL OF UNEMPLOYMENT DURATION 
 
The availability of data that reflects the amount of time a group of formerly unemployed individuals spent 
looking for a job before obtaining one suggests that one can build a multivariate model that contains covariates 
designed to reduce the observed variance in the data. 
 
The Displaced Worker Survey contains a data set that represents such a survey.  We use data from the 2000 
Displace Worker Survey.  The DWS is a government sponsored survey that asks questions about job tenure, 
joblessness duration and reemployment.  Displaced Workers are defined as persons age 20 or older who lost or left 
jobs because their plant of company closed or moved, there was insufficient work for them to do or their position or 
shift was abolished in the prior three years. Employees that were terminated for cause are not considered displaced 
workers and art not part of the DWS.   
 
RESOLUTION OF CASE STUDY 
 
When plaintiff‟s information on race, age, marital status and geographic location are inserted into the 
estimated duration model the estimated value of duration is ## weeks, with a standard deviation of ## weeks.  Plaintiff 
has been out of work for 97 weeks; this difference is over 2 standard deviations.  A two-standard deviation standard 
would conclude that search is unreasonable. 
 
We begin with a base regression incorporating as covariates as many applicable variables available in the 
DWS data set.  We limit the analysis to five variables to illustrate the model.  The variable selection results in a data 
set containing 248 records.  It is possible to incorporate many more variables to tailor the analysis more based on 
plaintiff‟s particulars.  A multivariate regression takes the following form: 
 
Y = βX + ε 
 
Where Y represents the explained variable – the natural logarithm of the duration of joblessness; X is the 
vector of five covariates (we added a variable that consists of the square of age, a transformed variable necessary for 
statistical tractability), β is the vector of associated covariate coefficients and ε represent regression error. A variable 
is considered applicable if it conveys information into any of the many socioeconomic and demographic 
characteristics of plaintiff. Thus, the multivariate regression is the following 
 
Natural logarithm of unemployment duration =  
 
β0  + β1*Age 
+ β2*Age Squared 
 + β3 *Married 
 + β4*Race 
 + β5*Region 
 + β6*Sex 
 
The output of the linear regression model is estimated values of the coefficients (β0- β6) and several 
regression diagnostics; these are found in the Table below. 
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Table 2:  Multivariate Regression Results 
 
Source SS df MS  Number of obs 248 
     F(  6,   241) 9.05 
Model 57.1131946 6 9.51886577  Prob > F 0 
Residual 253.375486 241 1.05135056  R-squared 0.1839 
     Adj R-squared 0.1636 
Total 310.48868 247 1.25703919  Root MSE 1.0254 
       
Ln(Duration) Coefficient Std. Error t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
Age 0.0596565 0.0224458 2.66 0.008 0.0154415 0.103872 
Age Squared -0.0003952 0.0002867 -1.38 0.169 -0.0009599 0.00017 
Married -0.4003548 0.1601879 -2.5 0.013 -0.7159018 -0.08481 
Race -0.3400359 0.1533799 -2.22 0.028 -0.6421722 -0.0379 
Region 0.5511477 0.1410425 3.91 0 0.2733143 0.828981 
Sex 0.0218976 0.1317246 0.17 0.868 -0.237581 0.281376 
constant 0.8514958 0.417598 2.04 0.043 0.0288879 1.674104 
 
 
To obtain an estimate of the predicted unemployment period it is possible to use the coefficients estimated in 
the model above and substitute plaintiff‟s particular values of each covariate.   
 
Yplaintiff = βestimated * Xplaintiff 
 
The first six columns in Table 3 below contain the covariate values representing plaintiff. The predicted 
value of the (logarithm) duration of joblessness is provided in column seven. 
 
 
Table 3:  Predicted Unemployment Duration  (in natural logarithms) 
 
Age Age Squared Married Race Region Sex Predicted ln(Duration) 
45 2025 1 1 1 1 2.568444 
 
 
However, this approach does not provide a measure of the standard error of the estimate for the expected 
logarithm of joblessness duration at the given values of the covariates.  A confidence interval is necessary to establish 
whether plaintiff‟s actual unemployment duration is distinctly different from the average unemployment duration. To 
obtain the standard error of the predicted value we run an ancillary regression.   
 
The estimator of Yplaintiff is  
 
β0+β1Age+β2Age Squared + β3Married+ β4Race+ β5Region+β6Sex 
 
We subtract the value of each covariate from each observation and then run the regression on the adjusted 
covariates.  Thus, we define a new set of covariates as follows: Age0 = Age – 45; Age Squared0 = Age Squared – 
2025; Married0 = Married – 1; Race0 = Race – 1; Region0 = Region-1 and Sex0= Sec -1. 
 
When we regress the logarithm of Joblessness Duration on these new covariates we get the regression results 
are found in the table below. 
Journal of Business & Economics Research - July 2006 Volume 4, Number 7 
 8 
Table 4:  Multivariate Regression on Adjusted Covariates 
 
Source SS df MS  Number of obs =     248 
     F(  6,   241) =    9.05 
Model 57.1132 6 9.518866  Prob > F      =  0.0000 
Residual 253.375 241 1.051351  R-squared     =  0.1839 
     Adj R-squared =  0.1636 
Total 310.489 247 1.257039  Root MSE      =  1.0254 
       
Ln(Duration) Coefficient Std. Error t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
age0 0.05966 0.0224458 2.66 0.008 0.015442 0.1038715 
agesq0 -0.0004 0.0002867 -1.38 0.169 -0.00096 0.0001695 
married0 -0.4004 0.1601879 -2.5 0.013 -0.7159 -0.0848077 
race0 -0.34 0.1533799 -2.22 0.028 -0.64217 -0.0378995 
region0 0.55115 0.1410425 3.91 0 0.273314 0.8289812 
sex0 0.0219 0.1317246 0.17 0.868 -0.23758 0.2813761 
_cons 2.56844 0.1737671 14.78 0 2.226148 2.91074 
 
 
The only difference between the results of the regressions on the adjusted versus the unadjusted covariates is 
the intercept, which is the prediction we want along with its standard error.
21
  Specifically, the predicted value is 
2.56844 and the associated standard error is 0.1738.  We still have to account for the unobserved factors in the error 
term.  To obtain the standard error of the prediction we rely on  
 
Se(ln duration of joblessness) = {[se(yo)]
2
 + σ2}1/2 
 
Thus, [(0.1738)
2
 + (1.024)
2
]
1/2
 = 1.03869.  Note that the prediction error accounts for a relatively minor 
portion of the standard error.   
 
Even though the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of unemployment duration, it is not possible to 
simply exponentiate the predicted value ln(duration of joblessness)  = 2.568 to obtain an estimate of the joblessness 
duration for plaintiff‟s cohort.  An adjustment is necessary to account for the nonlinear nature of the effect of the 
variance:  
 
E(y|x) = exp(σ2/2)*exp(βX) = αexp(ln of joblessness duration) 
 
Where σ2 is the variance of ε when ε ~Normal(0, σ2) 
A consistent estimator of the adjustment factor, α, can be obtained as follows:22 
 
(i) obtaining the fitted values of the dependent variable Yplaintiff 
(ii) Create a new variable m = exp(Yplaintiff) 
(iii) Regress the jobless duration variable on the new variable m without an intercept; the resulting coefficient is the 
estimate of α, the adjustment factor. 
 
The output of this ancillary regression is provided in the appendix to this paper; the summary output is 
presented in the table below, along with the (adjusted) predicted joblessness duration for plaintiff‟s cohort:  column 3 
is obtained from the other two according to the adjustment equation above.  The obtained estimate of average 
unemployment is 21.67 weeks.   
 
 
                                                 
21 It is not a coincidence that the slope coefficients, their standard errors and the diagnostics are similar.  This allows a check on the soundness of 
the covariate transformation.   
22
 See, generally, Jeffrey M. Wooldridge, Introductory Econometrics (2000) at 202-203. 
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Table 5:  Average Joblessness Duration 
 
Predicted ln(Joblessnes Duration) Adjustment Factor Mean Joblessness Duration 
(1) (2) (2)*exp(1) 
2.568444 1.660754 21.66538263 
 
 
Because the standard deviation and the mean share similar properties the adjustment factor similarly applies 
the estimated measure of prediction error.  Thus, the table below reproduces the obtained average joblessness duration 
and the estimated confidence interval.  
 
 
Average Joblessness Duration Lower Confidence Interval Upper Confidence Interval 
(weeks)                      (95%) 
21.7 12.5 30.9 
 
 
It is easily seen that plaintiff‟s joblessness duration of 97 weeks easily falls outside the estimated 2 standard 
deviation range and therefore is considered statistically significantly different – at the 95% level of significance -- 
from the 21.7 weeks that is the expected joblessness duration.  
 
What is the probability that we would observe plaintiff‟s joblessness duration if the null hypothesis is true 
(i.e. that average joblessness duration is 21.7 weeks)?   The standardized statistic for testing H0: μ = 21.7 weeks is Z = 
(21.7 – 97)/4.7 = -16.01. The value of -16.01 is so far out in the left tail of the standard normal distribution that we 
reject H0 at any reasonable significance level. Formally,  
 
p-value = P(Z > 16.03|H0) = 1 – Ф(16.03) = 0.00000 
 
The result above indicates that if the null hypothesis is actually true, it is unlikely that we would ever observe 
a value as large as 16.03.  In other words, the observed significance level indicates that the likelihood of a random 
result occurring is essentially zero.  This strongly suggests that plaintiff‟s search may not meet the reasonableness 
standard.   
 
The table below reflects the likelihood of observing a random result as the joblessness period varies.  For 
example, the second column indicates the observed joblessness duration and the column labeled “p-value” indicates 
the likelihood. Thus, for example, the table indicates that there is a 3.8 percent likelihood that we observe plaintiff 
being joblessness for 30 weeks.   
 
 
Average Joblessness 
Duration 
Plaintiff's Joblessness 
Duration Difference Normalized Statistic p-value 
(weeks) (weeks)     
21.7 97.0 -75.3 -16.03 0.0000 
21.7 85 -63.3 -13.48 0.0000 
21.7 60 -38.3 -8.16 0.0000 
21.7 50 -28.3 -6.03 0.0000 
21.7 40 -18.3 -3.90 0.0000 
21.7 35 -13.3 -2.84 0.0023 
21.7 30 -8.3 -1.77 0.0380 
21.7 25 -3.3 -0.71 0.2389 
21.7 23 -1.3 -0.28 0.3882 
21.7 22 -0.3 -0.07 0.4716 
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Figure 1 below provides a visual display of the table data.  The x-axis is inverted, ranging from highest point 
to lowest. 
Figure 1 
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Analysis 
 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, §706(g)(1), provided that, “Interim earnings or amounts earnable 
with reasonable diligence by the person or persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay 
otherwise allowable.”23   Although this language applies only to Title VII cases, the concept has been applied by 
specific reference to the Americans with Disabilities Act, and by court cases to the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act and other wrongful termination cases. 
 
The “amounts earnable with reasonable diligence” language is based on the common-law principle that a 
plaintiff, whether in a tort or breach of contract case, should not be entitled to damages that the plaintiff could 
reasonably have avoided.  “An unemployed or underemployed claimant, like all other Title VII claimants, is subject to 
the statutory duty to minimize damages set out in §706(g). This duty, rooted in an ancient principle of law, requires 
the claimant to use reasonable diligence in finding other suitable employment.”24 
 
However, even though based on common law, §706(g)(1) cases still are based on interpretation of the 
specific statutory language.  Thus, “Although the unemployed or underemployed claimant need not go into another 
line of work, accept a demotion, or take a demeaning position, he forfeits his right to backpay if he refuses a job 
substantially equivalent to the one he was denied.”25  In other words, modern cases do not apply the common-law 
mitigation of damages principle without qualification.  While the mitigation defense is not limited to the narrow 
situation where a plaintiff refuses a substantially equivalent job, it is clear that mitigation of damages under 
§706(g)(1) does not require the plaintiff to pursue and accept any available job for the sole purpose of mitigating the 
defendant‟s damages. 
 
The defendant has the burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, what the plaintiff would have 
earned with reasonable diligence.  There are three separate challenges that the defendant has to meet:  First, there has 
to be evidence that is legally admissible as relevant.  Second, the defendant has to prove the substantive elements of 
                                                 
23 Now codified at 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(g)(1). 
24 Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 231 (1982), footnotes omitted. 
25 Id., at 231-2, footnotes omitted.   
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the mitigation defense.  Third, since mitigation is a factual determination often made by a jury, the evidence needs to 
be presented in a manner that is comprehensible to the average juror.  We can address these in order. 
 
The first question is whether the statistical evidence will be admissible as relevant.  Statistical analysis has 
been used by plaintiffs for years in employment discrimination cases, generally to show that a pattern of 
discrimination in a disparate impact case cannot be explained by chance.  Early cases involved simple comparisons of 
proportions.
26
 As more complicated studies were introduced courts discussed standard deviations,
27
 correlation 
coefficients,
28
 significance levels,
29
 hypothesis tests,
30
 Mantel-Haenzel tests,
31
 scattergrams,
32
 ordinary least square 
regressions,
33
 reverse regressions.
34
 
 
One Court of Appeals has stated plainly, “It is now well-established that statistical evidence is admissible to 
prove employment discrimination.”35  Additionally, the Supreme Court has stated that statistics alone can be enough 
for the plaintiff to prove a prima facie case of discrimination, thus shifting the burden of proof to the defendant.
36
 
 
It does not necessarily follow, however, that a technique successfully used by a plaintiff to shift the burden of 
proof to the defendant could be used by the defendant to shift the burden of proof to the plaintiff.  This is because 
these cases involved the question of whether the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case of discrimination, generally 
by showing discriminatory impact.  What the plaintiff set out to prove was the existence of a discriminatory pattern, 
where statistics provided valuable evidence that an existing pattern would not have been produced by chance.  This is 
different from the employer‟s burden in defending a wrongful discharge case, where the burden is not to prove that a 
pattern would not have been created by chance, but rather that one specific individual did or did not act in a particular 
manner. 
 
Clearly, not every legal matter can be resolved by resort to statistics.  For instance, in Department of 
Commerce, et al. v. U.S. House of Representatives, et al, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that statistical sampling could 
not be used for census purposes to apportion Congressional representation.
37
 
 
However, the cases where plaintiffs used statistical evidence to prove a prima facie case of discrimination 
may still be instrumental to the defendant attempting to prove a mitigation defense.  Even if these cases do not give a 
defendant the ability to shift the burden of proof, they do appear to settle the issue of admissibility of statistical 
evidence. 
 
One example of where statistical evidence was offered by the defense to a claim of discrimination was 
Laugesen v. The Anaconda Company.
38
  There the trial court admitted statistical evidence offered by the defendant to 
demonstrate that it did not have a pattern of age discrimination, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. 
                                                 
26 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 235-36 (1976) (discussing the disparate impact of a civil service test on African-Americans seeking jobs as 
police officers); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971) (discussing the disparate impact on African-Americans of a high school 
diploma requirement and employment tests). 
27 EEOC v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 698 F.2d 633, 651  (4th Cir. 1983)   ("If  our  computation  is  correct,  the  standard  deviation for  pay grade 5  was  
-1.87.") 
28 Bernard v. Gulf Oil Corp., 890 F.2d 735, 742 (5th Cir. 1989) ( "Plaintiffs urge that a correlation coefficient in the .30-.40 range be established as 
the minimum for proof of a job related test. We decline to establish a bright line cut-off point for the establishment of jobrelatedness in testing."). 
29 Fed. Reserve Bank, 698 F.2d at 647 (recognizing that the 0.05 level is arbitrary). 
30 Moultrie v. Martin, 690 F.2d 1078, 1082 (4th Cir. 1982) ("Statisticians compare figures through an objective process known as hypothesis 
testing."). 
31 Hogan v. Pierce, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 115 (D.D.C. 1983). 
32 Cherry v. Amoco Oil Co., 490 F. Supp. 1026, 1028-29, 1030 (D. Ga. 1980) (finding that a sociologist's scattergram of "credit application 
acceptance rate" and the proportions of nonwhites residing in zip code regions merely demonstrated that "the computerized grading system [for 
issuing gasoline credit cards] taken as a whole tends to reject a disproportionate number of persons living in predominantly black areas").  
33 Craik v. Minn. State Univ. Bd., 731 F.2d 465, 476 n.13 (8th Cir. 1984) (noting that logistic regression should have been used, but relying on 
ordinary least squares regression because neither party explained the difference in the methods). 
34 Penk v. Or. State Bd. of Higher Educ., 36 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P 35,049 (D. Or. 1985), aff'd, 816 F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 1987). 
35 Sledge et al. v. J.P. Stevens, Inc., 585 F.2d 625, 635 (1978). 
36
 Hazelwood School District v. U.S., 392 F. Supp. 1276 (E.D. Mo.), rev‟d 534 F. 2nd 805, vacated and remanded, 433 U.S. 299 (1977). [concerning 
the race of newly hired teachers.]  
37  525 U.S. 316 (1999) 
38  510 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1975) 
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Another example is Green et al. v. United States Steel Corp.
39
  This was a class action discrimination claim, 
where the parties stipulated that damages would be calculated on a group basis.  In this case, as the back pay was 
determined on a group basis, the mitigation of damages was also determined statistically.  Although this case falls 
short of indicating that statistical measures can be used to calculate mitigation in an individual discrimination case, it 
confirms with the other cases cited above the admissibility of this type of evidence. 
 
The second question is whether the defendant has proved the substantive elements of the mitigation defense. 
 
Although the court cases are not entirely uniform, it appears that there are two elements to the mitigation 
defense, both of which must be proved by the defendant: 
 
 The plaintiff failed to exercise reasonable diligence in seeking other employment, and 
 
 There was a reasonable chance that the plaintiff might have found comparable employment if the plaintiff 
had exercised reasonable diligence.
40
 
 
What then, does the defendant have to demonstrate at trial?  The easiest scenario from the defendant‟s point 
of view is the one presented in the Ford Motor Co.
41
 case, where the defendant actually offered to the plaintiffs the 
same jobs they were originally denied. 
  
In the absence of a documented job offer, proof becomes more difficult.  While the existence of other jobs, 
and the plaintiff‟s qualifications for those jobs could be shown, what does a defendant have to demonstrate to prove 
that the plaintiff did not exercise reasonable diligence? 
 
The answer is, whatever will convince the trial fact finder, typically the jury.  Although both elements must 
be proved separately, in practice it may be that a jury really only needs to see direct proof of the second element, and 
is willing to interpolate proof of the first element.  As long as evidence supplied by the defendant is adequate to permit 
an appellate court to hold that a “...rational jury had a legally sufficient basis...”42 for the finding, the jury‟s decision 
will not be overturned on appeal.  Thus, a jury was satisfied by evidence that the plaintiff “...was an undisputedly 
qualified employee with a long and hitherto substantially unbroken work history.”43 Despite the fact that this was not 
direct evidence of whether or not the plaintiff was out pounding the proverbial pavement, the jury accepted it as 
circumstantial evidence, and its finding was affirmed on appeal.  So, even if statistical evidence will not literally shift 
the burden of proof to the plaintiff, it may have the effect of doing so in the eyes of the jurors. 
 
Thus, since juries are willing to conclude circumstantially that the plaintiff did not exercise reasonable 
diligence in seeking other employment, and since appellate courts are disinclined to overturn a jury verdict supported 
by legally-sufficient evidence, ultimately the defendant has to meet the third challenge, presenting the statistical 
evidence in a manner that is comprehensible to the average juror. 
 
Part of the challenge is the use of terminology that is understandable by jurors.  In this regard, courts have 
already taken the lead, by using the term “mitigation of damages” instead of the more oblique “doctrine of avoidable 
consequences.”  Similarly, economic and statistical experts will need to tailor their communications to their audience. 
 
At the present time, it is likely that a juror will respond more to “less than a five percent possibility that this 
could happen by chance” than he or she would to “greater than 2 standard deviations.”  Certainly, this might change 
over time.  A Lexis-Nexis search of U. S. District Court cases shows that the term “standard deviation” was used in 95 
                                                 
39  640 F. Supp. 1521 (E.D.Pa. 1986) (aff‟d sub nom. Green et al. v. USX Corporation 896 F.2d 801 (3d Cir. 1990). 
40 E.g., Anastasio v. Schering Corporation, 838 F.2d 701, 18-19 (3d Cir. 1988), stating that the “...court's interrogatories to jury properly placed on 
defendant the burden of showing „both that plaintiff failed to exercise reasonable diligence  to mitigate his damages, and that there was a reasonable 
likelihood that plaintiff might have found comparable work if he had exercised reasonable diligence.‟”); Weir v. Burroughs Corp. 619 F.2d 276, 
278 (3d Cir. 1980); and EEOC v. Gurnee Inn Corp., 914 F.2d 815, 818 (7th Cir. 1990).] 
41 Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219 
42 Sheehan v. Donlen Corp., 173 F.3d 1039, 1049 (7th Cir. 1999) 
43 Id. 
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cases between 1990 and 1994, and in 180 cases between 2000 and 2004.  It may be that statistics will follow DNA 
evidence in becoming a concept with which jurors are familiar.  However, in the meantime, an expert witness will 
need to be conscious of the clarity with which the statistical evidence is presented. 
 
Concluding Comments 
 
In this paper we empirically establish the expected joblessness duration period for a plaintiff‟s population 
cohort in a wrongful termination lawsuit; we also calculated the estimated duration period‟s associated standard error.  
We develop a hypothesis test examining whether the plaintiff‟s period of joblessness is statistically significantly 
different from the predicted test statistic in a manner consistent with case law.  Thus, we are able to empirically assess 
the soundness of the duration of plaintiff‟s job search and thereby enhance the robustness of present-day approaches.     
 
The approach presented here has many limitations; several econometric, others necessarily subordinated to 
the law and its interpretations.  As is well known, the complexity of multiple regression analysis can be challenged on 
a variety of grounds. 
 
For example, plaintiff could argue that essential variables are omitted from the model. After all, the 
Displaced Worker Survey recognizes many possibly relevant variables but does not account for many others, 
including those that are possibly a result of the discrimination process itself, such as the patient‟s emotional distress or 
lack of confidence.    
 
In addition, we rely on Displaced Worker Survey data.  Like other statistical procedure, the proposed test as 
used here can be challenged on the grounds that the Displaced Worker Survey may not be the appropriate population 
for comparison purposes; again, the DWS does not (knowingly) reflect workers that may have been terminated as a 
result of discrimination. 
 
However, to properly contest the model alleging omitted variables, plaintiff cannot merely list or allude to 
variables or factors but must demonstrate that including them would alter the statistical disparity.  In Bazemore, a 
unanimous Supreme Court noted: “The [Fourth Circuit‟s] view of the evidentiary value of the regression analysis was 
plainly incorrect. While the omission of variables from regression analysis may render the analysis less probative than 
may otherwise might be, it can hardly be said, absent some other infirmity, that an analysis which accounts for the 
major factors “must be considered unacceptable as evidence of discrimination.” Normally, failure to include variables 
will affect the analysis‟ probativeness, not its admissibility.  Importantly, it is clear that a regression analysis that 
includes less than “all measurable variables” may serve to prove a plaintiff‟s case.”44  
 
We cannot claim that the model does more than to improve on the subjectiveness of the opinion of job 
placement specialists, vocational experts and other experts typically proffered by counsel in raising a challenge to the 
reasonableness of a plaintiff‟s job search.  Clearly, the duty to mitigate challenge must be accompanied by collateral 
evidence in conjunction with the model; in tandem, they could be persuasive. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
44 Noted in Phillip I. Good, Applying Statistics in the Courtroom (Boca Raton: Chapman & Hall/CRC, 2001) at 199. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 6:  Ancillary Regression, Calculation of Logarithm Adjustment Factor 
 
Source SS df MS  Number of obs = 248 
     F(  1,   247) 173.71 
Model 74954.7806 1 74954.7806  Prob > F 0 
Residual 106579.219 247 431.494815  R-squared 0.4129 
     Adj R-squared 0.4105 
Total 181534 248 731.991935  Root MSE 20.772 
       
Joblessness 
Duration Coefficient Std. Error t-statistic P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
       
mhat 1.660754 0.1260067 13.18 0 1.41257 1.90894 
 
 
NOTES 
 
 
